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Summary: The financial crisis and ensuing economic meltdown has led to
sharp increases in the deficits and debt levels of many advanced economies.
The run-up in public sector indebtedness helped to restore private sector bal-
ance sheets, laying the foundation for economic recovery in these regions. But
the so-called “sovereign” debt crisis in the Eurozone has undermined the fiscal 
resolve that has, thus far, kept truly sovereign governments from slipping into a
bona fide depression. Fearful of becoming the next Greece, governments that
could allow an unlimited fiscal adjustment to restore full employment, are me-
thodically weakening their fiscal support mechanisms and setting themselves
on a path to becoming the next Japan.
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In 1943, Abba P. Lerner published an essay entitled “Functional Finance and the 
Federal Debt.”
1 It began with a recognition that “[a]part from the necessity of win-
ning the war, there is no task facing society today so important as the elimination of 
economic insecurity” (1943, p. 38). At the time, the Allies were engaged in the most 
widespread war in history, and millions of people were still reeling from the harsh 
effects of the most severe economic depression the world has ever known. Yet 
Lerner insisted that the government address both problems, urging policymakers to 
unleash the full force of their fiscal arsenal to achieve victory on both the interna-
tional and domestic warfronts. By 1945, the Allies had defeated Germany and Japan, 
and the post-war expansion ushered in nearly three decades of uninterrupted growth 
and economic prosperity. 
Almost seventy years later, following the near collapse of the world’s finan-
cial system in 2007, war and economic insecurity are again ravaging much of the 
world’s population. Since the eve of the global economic crisis in 2007, the world 
has added 27.6 million people to the unemployment rolls, produced a vulnerable em-
ployment rate of 50.1%, created an additional 40 million working poor, and caused 
1.7 million youths to simply drop out of the labor force altogether (United Nations, 
Non-Governmental Liaison Services (NGLS) 2011). But this time, instead of a stead-
fast commitment to an aggressive fiscal response, the European debt crisis has 
                                                        
1 Lerner went on to develop these ideas in The Economics of Control (1944) and The Economic of Em-
ployment (1951).    
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spooked countries like the United States, Australia, Canada and the United Kingdom 
into behaving as if they, too, might be approaching a “tipping point” that could push 
them to the brink of default. To avoid such a calamity, these governments are at-
tempting to reign in their deficits, succumbing to the argument that fiscal austerity is 
the logical pathway to economic prosperity. And it is all the tragic result of a flawed 
application of the Government Budget Constraint (GBC).   
 
1. The Government Budget Constraint 
 
In the wake of the financial meltdown, the world’s largest central banks responded 
by drastically reducing interest rates, and national governments in China, the U.S., 
the U.K. and elsewhere responded with a host of tax cuts and spending increases that 
helped to move their budgets deeply into deficit.
2 Critics of these policies immedi-
ately voiced their opposition.  
In the U.S., Americans have been subjected to a daily barrage of deficit hys-
teria from every major media outlet – newspapers, radio and television “news” pro-
grams all routinely hype the notion that the country is “broke” or “going broke.” 
During one interview, President Obama went so far as to actually declare that the 
U.S. government had run “out of money” (C-SPAN 2009). More recently, his Fiscal 
Deficit Commission concluded that significant cuts to Medicare and Social Security 
must be made in order to prevent an imminent loss of confidence, a European-style 
debt crisis and a possible default on the debt. And it amounts to “one of the greatest 
misinformation campaigns of all time” (James K. Galbraith 2010).  
Unfortunately, the core of our discipline has done nothing to help the public 
gain a better understanding of these issues. Instead, some of the most recognizable 
names in our field are responsible for providing the empirical ammunition that has 
been used to justify fiscal austerity and attacks on some our most important social 
safety programs. For example, Alan J. Auerbach et al. (2003), Jagadeesh Gokhale 
and Kent Smetters (2003), and Laurence J. Kotlikoff and Scott Burns (2004) have 
offered highly formalistic models that purport to demonstrate that the U.S. is on an 
unsustainable fiscal path. Fiscal “sustainability”, as presented in this literature, is 
rooted in the Intertemporal Government Budget Constraint (IGBC), a construct that 
is derived from the Government Budget Constraint (GBC) and a key assumption that 
private credit markets set the long-term real interest rate on the national debt. To un-
derstand the argument, we begin with the well-known GBC: 
 
                  ∆             ∆   
 
which shows that non-interest government spending (G) plus interest on the national 
debt held by the non-government sector (iB
Non-Govt) are equal to tax receipts (T), 
changes to the quantity of government bonds held by the non-government sector 
(∆B
Non-Govt), and changes to the monetary base (∆M). It is then argued that: (1) “print-
ing money” via ∆M is inflationary and something that should be avoided (Niall Fer-
                                                        
2 It is worth nothing that significant budget deficits would have resulted even without proactive measures 
(e.g. stimulus packages) due to automatic stabilizers. It is also worth nothing, as Greece is beginning to 
discover, that fiscal austerity tends to increase rather than decrease the deficit.    
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guson and Kotlikoff 2003); and (2) deficit spending is constrained ex ante by “mar-
ket forces” (i.e. the government’s ability to borrow to cover the shortfall). This sec-
ond proposition is then fortified with the orthodox assumption that the interest rate 
paid on the national debt is set in private financial markets as in the loanable funds 
framework. Together, the GBC and the orthodox treatment of real interest rate de-
termination give rise to the Intertemporal Government Budget Constraint (IGBC) 
that is at the heart of the fiscal imbalance literature. 
Following Olivier Blanchard et al. (1990), the GBC can be manipulated to 




This equation shows that if the primary budget is balanced, public debt will 
increase at r, but the debt ratio will increase at (r-g). And here we reach the familiar 
result that the public debt ratio         ⁄ ) will decline even when the primary deficit 
          is increasing, as long as output growth (g) is sufficiently greater than the 
real interest rate (r). However, conventional theory tends to dismiss this possibility, 
arguing that persistent deficits will raise interest rates via a decline in national sav-
ing.
3  
The outcome is rooted in a loanable funds approach, which holds that real in-
terest rates are set by “real economic forces” (i.e. saving, capital), whereas nominal 
rates simply account for inflation expectations (as in the Fisher effect). Thus, accord-
ing to Eric Engen and Glenn R. Hubbard, “[a] standard benchmark for understanding 
and calibrating the potential effect of changes in government debt on interest rates is 
a standard model based on an aggregate production function for the economy in 
which government debt replaces, or ‘crowds out’, physical productive capital” (2004, 
p. 4). 
In a similar vein, some recent work that builds on Martin S. Feldstein (1986) 
focuses on the effects of anticipated deficits. For example, Thomas Laubach (2003) 
and William G. Gale and Peter R. Orszag (2004) claim to show that a one percent 
increase in the five-year ahead (projected) deficit-to-GDP ratio raises five-year ahead 
long-term Treasury rates by anywhere from 20-60 basis points. If the projected defi-
cits are large enough, the IGBC predicts unlimited growth in the interest burden and 
an ever-increasing fiscal imbalance. Calculated in this way, Gokhale and Smetters 
(2006) have argued that the U.S. faces a fiscal imbalance that could reach $65 tril-
lion. It therefore follows that the government must take immediate steps to drasti-
cally reduce projected deficits (e.g. through entitlement reform) in order to avoid the 
kinds of dire consequences that have been hyped by Kotlikoff and Burns, who warn:  
 
“History is replete with examples of what happens when countries can’t pay their 
bills. They raise taxes to exorbitant levels, default on their explicit or implicit obliga-
tions, and begin printing money like mad. This triggers inflation, drives interest rates 
                                                        
3 For a discussion of the empirical evidence on the relationship between deficits and interest rates see 
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through the roof, and sends exchange rates down the tubes. Businesses go belly up, 
and banks shut their doors. The result is financial and economic meltdown” (2004, 
xxiii). 
 
In what follows, I shall argue that while history is “replete with examples of 
countries that can’t pay their bills,” it is not replete with examples that can be applied 
to the U.S. or to countries like it. Specifically, the IGBC (and the implications that 
follow from it) are not applicable to countries that issue debt denominated in a non-
convertible sovereign currency.  
 
2. The Importance of Sovereignty 
 
The notion of “fiscal sustainability,” as described in the “fiscal imbalance” literature, 
is fundamentally flawed because it fails to distinguish a sovereign issuer of the cur-
rency from its non-sovereign user(s). Specifically, the orthodox approach assumes 
that the issuer of a sovereign, non-convertible (i.e. flexible exchange rate) currency 
must, “like any other institution within the economy, accept the terms of credit im-
posed by ‘market forces’ as in the supply and demand for loanable funds framework” 
(Fullwiler 2006, p. 3). Thus, the dominant macroeconomic models predict that rising 
deficits and debt-to-GDP ratios will tend to spark inflation and undercut growth by 
driving up long-term interest rates. But this is simply not the case, as history has 
shown: 
 
“In both the US and the UK … there is no visible relationship between the public debt 
ratio and inflation. For example, the peak US public debt ratio of 109% in 1946 was 
followed by a decade of low inflation. Similarly, both American and British histories 
fail to show that high public debt is a drag on growth; in fact, peaks in the public debt 
ratio have been precursors to unusually strong economic growth” (David A. Levy and 
Srinivas Thiruvadanthi 2010).  
 
Unfortunately, such historical regularities have not prevented influential 
voices from insisting that the GBC’s dire predictions will materialize. For example, 
Arthur B. Laffer (2009) took aim at Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke and 
U.S. President Barack Obama, warning that their policies would eventually exact a 
huge price on the American economy. Specifically, Laffer (2009) predicted that the 
central bank’s monetary operations will lead to “rapidly rising prices,” and that the 
large U.S. budget deficits will cause “much, much higher interest rates”. He said: 
 
“Here we stand more than a year into a grave economic crisis with a projected budget 
deficit of 13% of GDP…With U.S. GDP and federal tax receipts at about $14 trillion 
and $2.4 trillion respectively, such a debt all but guarantees higher interest rates, 
massive tax increases, and partial default on government promises.” (ibid.). 
 
But Laffer’s arguments simply follow from the flawed application of the GBC 
to a sovereign issuer of a non-convertible currency. 
In countries like the U.S., deficits tended to decrease, rather than increase, in-
terest rates. This is because deficit spending leads to a net injection of reserves into 
the banking system. (And big deficits imply big injections of reserves.) When the 
banking system is flush with reserves, the price of those reserves – in the U.S. the  
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federal funds rate – can easily fall to zero. Unless a zero-bid is consistent with Fed 
policy, the central bank will begin selling bonds in order to drain excess reserves. 
The bond sales continue until the fed funds rate falls within the Fed's target band.
4    
Thus, the interest rate is a policy variable, and the Federal Reserve can always 
hit any nominal interest rate it chooses, regardless of the size of the budget deficit (or 
debt). Of course, this is also true for other sovereign issuers of non-convertible cur-
rencies. Take, for example, the case of Japan, where, despite a persistent debt-to-
GDP ratio well in excess of 100%, the Bank of Japan (BOJ) never lost the ability to 
set the key overnight interest rate, which has remained below 1% for about a decade. 
And, because the BOJ, like the Fed, also has the power to move rates at the other end 
of the yield curve (e.g. through quantitative easing), rates on 10-yr government bonds 
trended sharply downward even as Japan's public sector debt exploded. In short, 
Laffer's prediction about the future trajectory of U.S. interest rates is based on a 
faulty understanding of the relationship between deficit spending, bank reserves and 
interest rates. The recent U.S. (and past Japanese) experience serves as prime exam-
ples of his flawed logic.   
Another flaw in the orthodox approach stems from the notion that increases in 
the budget deficit (and the subsequent increase in the national debt) will require 
higher taxes in the future, as Laffer suggests. But as Bell (2000) showed for the case 
of the U.S., taxes do not, indeed cannot, “pay for” government purchases. Taxes 
drain reserves (an important function) and constrain aggregate demand, but they do 
not “finance” the past, present or future spending of a sovereign issuer of the cur-
rency. To appreciate the argument, one needs only to work through the balance sheet 
entries (as in Bell 2000) that are implied by the Treasury’s fiscal operations. This 
somewhat rigorous analysis is beyond the scope of the current paper, and so we turn, 
again, to the historical record.  
With the exception of a brief period in the late 1990s and early 2000s, the U.S. 
has been on a trajectory of rising deficits and debt levels since Ronald Reagan nearly 
tripled the size of the national debt in the mid-1980s. But the Reagan-Bush deficits 
only pushed the debt-to-GDP ratio to about 60 percent, nowhere near the highs that 
were reached in the post-WWII era, when the national debt as a percent of GDP 
topped 120 percent.  
As we debate the relationship between current and projected deficits, it is, 
perhaps, instructive to recall that corporate taxes, as well as taxes on the wealthiest 
Americans, trended downward for decades, following the greatest run-up of public 
debt in the history of our nation. And, while payroll taxes have risen steadily over the 
past 40 years, tax revenues, as a percentage of GDP have barely budged in more than 
50 years. Thus, Laffer's assertion that the current run-up in government debt will re-
quire “massive tax increases” simply isn’t borne out by the U.S. experience. And, it 
wasn't the case in Japan either, where, despite an explosive increase in the govern-
ment debt – near 200 percent of GDP at present – taxes remain among the lowest in 
the developed world.   
 
                                                        
4 Detailed explanations of reserve accounting and coordination between the U.S. Treasury and the Feder-
al Reserve can be found in Stephanie A. Bell (2000) and Fullwiler (2005, 2006).    
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Finally, Laffer contends that a “partial default on government promises” is an 
inevitable consequence of the Obama administration's “ill-conceived” fiscal policies. 
At best, a statement like this is misleading. At worst, it is intellectually dishonest. As 
any serious macro economist knows, a government like the United States – i.e. one 
that issues a sovereign, non-convertible currency – can meet any and all outstanding 
financial obligations, provided the debts are denominated in the national currency. 
This is a point that has been made by Alan Greenspan, who conceded that a “gov-
ernment cannot become insolvent with respect to obligations in its own cur-
rency…[it] can produce such claims without limit” (1997).  
 
3. Then Why Are the PIIGS in Trouble? 
 
Whereas the U.S., the U.K, Canada and Australia all have monetary systems that are 
in some sense “wedded” to their fiscal systems, there has been a “divorce” of fiscal 
and monetary institutions under Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) within the 
Eurozone. As Jan Kregel put it, “this represents a radical change in the monetary or-
ganization of Europe” (1999, p. 36), whereby fiscal power remains at the national 
level while monetary authority has been transferred to a single federal European Sys-
tem of Central Banks (ESCB). As a consequence, the relationship between control 
over money and the ability to sustain aggregate demand at full employment – the 
crux of Lerner’s Functional Finance – is severed under monetary union.  
In the run-up to the launching of the euro, few economists recognized the sig-
nificance of this change, focusing, instead, on the advantages of creating a truly in-
dependent central bank and the efficiency gains that would result from using a single 
currency. A notable exception was Charles Goodhart (1998), who questioned the 
plan to abandon the globally dominant “One Nation, One Money” model in favor of 
the current “One Market, One Money” model. John Smithin also raised concerns, 
very early on, arguing that the adoption of the euro carried “the most far-reaching 
implications for national sovereignty in public policy making, not only (as is obvi-
ous) with respect to monetary policy, but in other important areas also” (1999, p. 49). 
Thus, while everyone recognized that the national central banks – e.g. the Bundes-
bank and the Banc de France – would be handing their monetary policy-making au-
thority over to the ECB, only a handful of economists understood that the member 
governments would be handing their fiscal policy-making authority over to the bond 
markets. Two economists who did recognize this were Barry Eichengreen and Jurgen 
von Hagen, who presciently wrote: 
 
“Imagine that a government of a member state – call it Italy for illustrative purposes – 
experiences a revenue shortfall. It finds it difficult to service its debt. Bondholders 
concerned about the interruption of debt service begin to sell their bonds, depressing 
their price and forcing the Italian government to raise the interest rate it offers when it 
attempts to roll over maturing issues. The rise in interest rates further widens the gap 
between government revenues and expenditures, exacerbating the fiscal problem. 
Problems in the bond market threaten to spill over to other financial markets, because, 
for example, higher interest rates depress equity prices. In the worst-case scenario, the 
collapse of asset prices and the impact of higher interest rates on corporate profitabil-
ity and the performance of outstanding loans can threaten the stability of the banking 
system” (1995, p. 224).  
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This is precisely the problem with the PIIGS.  
By abandoning control over the issuance of their sovereign currencies, the 
governments of the EUR-16 have become users of a non-sovereign (stateless) 
money. Wynne Godley tried desperately to dissuade Europe from charting this 
course, arguing that it would “bring an end to the sovereignty of its component na-
tions and their power to take independent action on major issues” (1992, p. 39). 
Similarly, Malcolm Sawyer warned that under the new arrangements, “national gov-
ernments will no longer have the ability to ‘print money’ to pay interest on bonds, 
and their ability to pay depends on their ability to levy the necessary taxation” (1999, 
p. 11). Thus, while many expected the euro to transform the region into a sort of 
“United States of Europe”, it has actually left its individual member states looking 
more like California, Texas or New York, all of whom (as users of the currency) are 
constrained in their ability to run deficits. 
Thus, unlike the U.S. government, which faces no external budget constraint, 
governments within the EUR-16 do face external financing constraints. Two impor-
tant implications follow. First, member states must secure the funds required to spend 
in excess of current receipts before they can engage in deficit spending. Thus, their 
ability to deficit spend depends upon the willingness of private lenders to extend 
credit in advance. Second, unlike the bonds issued by the U.S. government, the obli-
gations of the EUR-16 are no longer free of default risk, and this means that markets 
make lending decisions on the basis of their perception of member states’ creditwor-
thiness. What matters, then, is the government’s ability “to balance its budget, to get 
a zero ex post deficit, so as to protect the banks against the risk of accumulating pub-
lic debt” (Alain Parguez 1999, p. 72). Governments that manage to run relatively 
small deficits will be able to obtain credit on better terms (athough the terms will still 
be dictated by financial markets). Those that experience rising deficits will be in-
creasingly constrained by the pressure of fiscal competition.  
Jerry L. Jordan stated the implications succinctly: 
 
“The risk for the fiscal authorities of any member country is that the ‘dismal 
arithmetic’ of the budget constraint leaves few palatable alternatives. If the 
yield on government securities demanded by markets exceeds a country’s 
nominal income growth, then interest expense on the outstanding debt must 
become a relatively larger burden” (1997, p. 3). 
 
Thus, the traditional link between the Treasury and the central bank has been 
severed under EMU, which means that unlike currencies that are “creatures of the 
state,” as Lerner put it, financial markets are now “the ultimate source of legitimacy” 
for the euro (Parguez 1999, p. 66).    
 
4. Summary and Conclusions 
 
As Lerner (1947) recognized in an essay entitled Money as a Creature of the State, 
there is an important link between sovereignty over money and sovereignty over pol-
icy. Governments that control their own currencies can coordinate their fiscal and 
monetary operations and prevent financial markets from dictating the terms of fi-
nance. They can spend first and borrow later, as Bell (2000) and Fullwiler (2006)  
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have shown. They can “afford” anything that is for sale in the domestic unit of ac-
count. They can sustain the debt at any level. They can restore growth and eliminate 
economic insecurity, implementing their policies in accordance with the principles of 
Functional Finance. 
In contrast, governments that have broken the link between control over 
money and control over policy (e.g. the EUR-16) have found it impossible to sustain 
the kind of large-scale interventions that are needed to recover their depressed 
economies. They must borrow before they can spend. They must pay market rates. 
Their debts can become unsustainable. Their finances are dysfunctional. Until the 
link between money and policy is restored – either through full, political unification 
or through an expansion of lending facilities at the ECB – they will remain helpless 
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